The Five Most Important Eleventh Circuit Trademark and Lanham Act Decisions of 2025 — and What They Mean for Florida Brand Owners

The Eleventh Circuit’s trademark docket in 2025 was not large, but it was consequential. In a year without a blockbuster likelihood-of-confusion opinion, the court instead answered a series of practical questions that determine whether a brand owner’s rights can actually be enforced:

• Whether a counterfeiter can escape a seven-figure statutory-damages verdict by pointing to small actual losses;
• Whether a foreign holding company that owns U.S. trademark registrations can be sued in a U.S. court;
• Whether a Lanham Act judgment can be wiped out in a corporate bankruptcy;
• Whether a former licensee can keep selling under the mark after the license is gone; and
• What a Florida consumer must plead to hold a brand and its influencers liable for undisclosed paid endorsements.

Each of those questions arises constantly in the enforcement work we do for Florida clients, and each now has a clear answer. This post reviews the five decisions we consider most important, explains what each holds, and closes with the key considerations that follow for brand owners in Florida. We also note two 2026 decisions that continue the trend. For our trademark and enforcement practices, see Trademark Matters and Litigation & Enforcement.

Top Tobacco, L.P. v. Star Importers & Wholesalers, Inc. (April 30, 2025): Statutory Damages for Counterfeiting Need Not Track Actual Harm

The Facts

Republic Tobacco’s TOP® and JOB® cigarette rolling papers have been on the market for more than a century. Acting on a tip, Republic made test purchases from Star Importers, a Georgia wholesaler, and laboratory testing confirmed that the papers Star was distributing were counterfeit—and contained an unidentified constituent not present in the genuine product. Police executed a search warrant at Star’s warehouse and seized 704 jars of counterfeit papers. Republic sued Star and its president under the Lanham Act and elected statutory damages under 15 U.S.C. § 1117(c), which permits an award of $1,000 to $200,000 per counterfeit mark per type of goods sold, rising to $2,000,000 per mark if the counterfeiting was willful. The jury found that Star’s conduct was not willful, but awarded $123,000 per mark across nine marks—$1,107,000 in total—and found Star’s president personally liable.

The Holding

Star argued on appeal that the verdict bore no relationship to Republic’s actual damages, that the jury could not award damages to deter or punish absent a willfulness finding, and that the award violated due process. Writing for a unanimous panel, Chief Judge Pryor rejected each argument. Statutory damages are available “instead of actual damages and profits,” and, in the court’s words, “[i]t makes no sense to consider the disparity between ‘actual harm’ and an award of statutory damages when statutory damages are designed precisely for instances where actual harm is difficult or impossible to calculate.” A finding of willfulness is not a prerequisite to an award within the non-willful range, and the jury was correctly so instructed. And under the Supreme Court’s long-standing standard for statutory penalties, an award is unconstitutional only if it is “so severe and oppressive as to be wholly disproportioned to the offense and obviously unreasonable”; an award of $123,000 per mark, well below the $200,000 non-willful ceiling and far below the willful ceiling, was not.

Why It Matters

Counterfeiting cases are frequently brought against wholesalers, importers and online sellers whose individual sales are modest and whose records are poor, making actual damages nearly impossible to prove. Top Tobacco confirms that in the Eleventh Circuit a brand owner may elect statutory damages, ask a jury for a substantial per mark award without proving willfulness, and defend the verdict against a due process challenge so long as it falls within the statutory range and is not obviously unreasonable. It also confirms that the officer who directs the counterfeit sales can be held personally liable—which matters because the entity is often judgment-proof. Notably, the number of marks drives the arithmetic: nine marks at $123,000 each produced a seven-figure award against a defendant the jury found was not even willful. Brand owners with product lines that carry multiple registered marks (house mark, product mark, logo, slogan) should register and plead each of them.

Jekyll Island-State Park Authority v. Polygroup Macau Ltd. (June 10, 2025): A Foreign Holding Company That Registers U.S. Trademarks Can Be Sued in the United States

The Facts

The Jekyll Island-State Park Authority, a Georgia public entity, has operated the Summer Waves Water Park since 1990 and owns a federal registration for SUMMER WAVES dating from that year. In 2015, Polygroup Macau Limited—a British Virgin Islands intellectual-property holding company that owns more than sixty U.S. trademark registrations—registered three SUMMER WAVES marks for inflatable pools and pool products. Polygroup Macau sells nothing in the United States itself. It “permits” sister companies, including a Delaware corporation with offices in Georgia and Texas, to use the marks, and those companies sell hundreds of SUMMER WAVES products through Costco, Walmart, Home Depot, Amazon and Target. In 2021, Polygroup Macau’s general counsel, a member of the Georgia bar, asked Jekyll Island to sell it the summerwaves.com domain. Jekyll Island instead sued for infringement, unfair competition and cancellation of Polygroup Macau’s registrations for fraud. The district court dismissed for lack of personal jurisdiction, reasoning that the sister companies’ sales, not Polygroup Macau’s registrations, were the “but for” cause of any infringement.

The Holding

The Eleventh Circuit, in an opinion by Judge Wilson joined by Judges Rosenbaum and Lagoa, reversed. Applying Rule 4(k)(2)—the “national long-arm statute” that permits jurisdiction over a foreign defendant with sufficient contacts with the United States as a whole when no single state has jurisdiction—the court held that Polygroup Macau had purposefully availed itself of the United States in three ways. First, by registering and maintaining more than sixty U.S. trademarks, it “deliberately engaged in significant activities” here and “created continuing obligations”: it paid fees, attested to use of the marks in U.S. commerce, and filed periodic declarations of use. Obtaining a property interest from a U.S. agency, the court held, is purposeful availment. Second, by allowing its sister companies to sell hundreds of products under the marks through major U.S. retailers, it reached the U.S. market, and “[i]f International Shoe stands for anything it is that a truly interstate or international business may not shield itself from suit by a careful but formalistic structuring of its business dealings.” Third, the Polygroup website was aimed squarely at U.S. consumers. Rejecting the district court’s strict causation test in light of Ford Motor Co. v. Montana Eighth Judicial District Court, the court held that Jekyll Island’s claims “related to” those contacts: the fraud-cancellation claim arose directly from the registrations, and the infringement claims related to registrations Polygroup Macau had obtained and maintained by relying on its affiliates’ use in U.S. commerce. Jurisdiction was fair, the court added, because the United States has a strong interest in disputes over rights that exist only under its law, and a plaintiff is entitled to stop infringement “from the source” rather than chase each affiliate separately.

Why It Matters

A large share of the infringing goods sold in Florida—through Amazon, Walmart Marketplace, and the ports of Miami and Jacksonville—are branded by offshore holding companies that own the U.S. registrations while operating affiliates make the sales. Before Jekyll Island, those holding companies routinely moved to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction, forcing brand owners to sue distributors one at a time. Jekyll Island is now the leading appellate authority that affirms the act of registering and maintaining U.S. trademarks, combined with sales through affiliates, subjects the registrant to suit in the United States on claims relating to those marks. It is also a warning to Florida companies that hold their own marks offshore: the structure that shields the entity from tax or liability elsewhere will not shield it from a Lanham Act suit here.

BenShot, LLC v. 2 Monkey Trading, LLC (July 9, 2025): A Lanham Act Judgment for Willful and Malicious Conduct Survives a Corporate Subchapter V Bankruptcy

The Facts

BenShot, a family-owned Wisconsin company, makes drinking glasses with a bullet embedded in the side. Two Florida companies, 2 Monkey Trading and Lucky Shot USA, imported similar glasses from China and advertised them as “Made in the USA”—while, in an email to the Chinese supplier, their principal instructed: “do not show faces of workers or any words or writing in Chinese. We want our customers to think this product could be made in USA.” A jury in the Eastern District of Wisconsin found false advertising under the Lanham Act and Wisconsin common law, awarded approximately $3.15 million including punitive damages, and specifically found that the defendants had acted “maliciously toward” BenShot or “in an intentional disregard of” its rights. The defendants then filed Subchapter V small-business reorganization cases in the Middle District of Florida and sought to discharge the judgment through a nonconsensual plan. The bankruptcy court held that Section 523(a)’s exceptions to discharge—including the exception for debts arising from “willful and malicious injury”—apply only to individual debtors, and dismissed BenShot’s nondischargeability complaint.

The Holding

The Eleventh Circuit reversed in a published opinion by Judge Lagoa, over a dissent by Judge Luck. Section 1192 of the Bankruptcy Code, which governs discharge under a nonconsensual Subchapter V plan, excepts “any debt ... of the kind specified in section 523(a).” The majority held that the phrase “of the kind” refers to the categories of debt listed in Section 523(a), not to the identity of the debtor, and that the Code’s definitions of “debt” and “debtor” draw no distinction between individuals and corporations. The court aligned itself with the Fourth and Fifth Circuits and against the Ninth Circuit’s Bankruptcy Appellate Panel and a majority of bankruptcy courts, and held that a corporate Subchapter V debtor cannot discharge a debt of the kind specified in Section 523(a)—including a judgment for willful and malicious injury—through a nonconsensual plan.

Why It Matters

Subchapter V, enacted in 2019, has become the bankruptcy vehicle of choice for small and mid-sized infringers, and Florida’s bankruptcy courts see a large share of the filings. Until BenShot, a corporate infringer in this circuit could reasonably expect to cram down a plan over the brand owner’s objection and discharge most of a Lanham Act judgment. Now, a judgment that rests on findings of willful and malicious conduct—the kind of findings that support punitive damages under state law and enhanced damages under the Lanham Act—will survive the bankruptcy. The practical lesson is that the findings matter as much as the amount: a brand owner who wants a judgment that is bankruptcy-proof should plead and prove willfulness and malice, ask for special-verdict questions on those issues, and obtain express findings in any bench trial or default judgment.

Nutradose Labs, LLC v. Bio Dose Pharma, LLC (January 30, 2025): A Former Licensee Cannot Sell Under the Mark, and the First-Sale Doctrine Will Not Save It

The facts

Unipharma registered the GLUTADOSE mark in 2019 and licensed it exclusively to Bio Dose Pharma, a Florida company controlled by Raimundo Santamarta, who had created the product. When Unipharma entered bankruptcy in 2020, its assets—including the mark—were sold under an asset purchase agreement that treated the license as an “excluded liability,” and the mark eventually passed to Nutradose. Bio Dose kept selling GLUTADOSE products and kept representing on its website that the products originated with it. Nutradose sued for infringement in the Southern District of Florida and won.

The Holding

In an unpublished per curiam opinion (Judges Rosenbaum, Newsom and Abudu), the Eleventh Circuit affirmed. It rejected the license defense because the license had been extinguished in the bankruptcy sale, so Bio Dose retained no right to use the mark. It then rejected the first-sale defense—the rule that resale of genuine, trademarked goods is not infringement—on two independent grounds: a former licensee is not entitled to sell off remaining inventory under the mark once the license ends, and, in any event, Bio Dose’s website misrepresented the origin of the goods in a way that confused consumers about whether GLUTADOSE products came from Bio Dose. The first-sale doctrine protects the truthful resale of genuine goods— it does not protect a seller that holds itself out as the source.

Why It Matters

Though unpublished, Nutradose addresses two recurring Florida scenarios with unusual clarity. The first is the terminated licensee or distributor who continues to sell—often the brand owner’s most damaging infringer, because it has the inventory, the customer list and the plausible claim of legitimacy. The second is the reseller who invokes the first-sale doctrine while doing more than reselling. The decision confirms that in this circuit the doctrine has limits: it does not extend to ex-licensees selling off stock, and it is lost entirely when the seller’s own marketing misrepresents the relationship. Brand owners drafting licenses should address post-termination sell-off expressly, and brand owners acquiring marks out of bankruptcy should ensure that the purchase agreement treats existing licenses as excluded—the provision that decided this case.

Pop v. LuliFama.com LLC (August 1, 2025): Undisclosed Influencer Endorsements Under FDUTPA Must Be Pleaded with Particularity

The facts

Alin Pop bought Luli Fama swimwear after seeing Instagram posts by influencers wearing it. The influencers had been paid by the brand and had not disclosed the payment as the Federal Trade Commission’s endorsement guides require. Pop sued the brand and the influencers under the Florida Deceptive and Unfair Trade Practices Act (FDUTPA), alleging that the undisclosed paid endorsements were deceptive. The district court dismissed with prejudice.

The Holding

In a published opinion by Judge Branch, joined by Judges Rosenbaum and Kidd, the Eleventh Circuit affirmed. The court held that a FDUTPA claim that “sounds in fraud”—one whose allegations track the elements of common law fraud, as a deceptive-endorsement theory does—must satisfy the heightened pleading standard of Rule 9(b). Pop’s complaint failed that standard because it did not identify which defendants’ posts he saw, when he saw them, which products they promoted, or what he bought in reliance. In the court’s words, it lacked “the who, what, when, where, and how” of the alleged deception. The court also affirmed the denial of leave to amend because Pop had not properly requested it.

Why it matters

Pop is not a Lanham Act case, but FDUTPA is the Florida companion to Section 43(a)—a Lanham Act violation is a per se FDUTPA violation, and FDUTPA claims are pleaded in nearly every trademark and false-advertising complaint filed in this state. The decision cuts in two directions for brand owners. As plaintiffs, brand owners asserting FDUTPA claims that rest on deception must now plead them with the particularity of a fraud claim: the specific statements, the dates, the speakers, and the resulting purchases. A FDUTPA count that simply incorporates the Lanham Act allegations by reference is at risk. As defendants, brands that use influencers gain a meaningful pleading defense against consumer class actions based on undisclosed endorsements—but only a pleading defense. The underlying obligation to ensure that paid influencers disclose the relationship remains, the FTC and the Florida Attorney General enforce it directly, and a well-pleaded complaint identifying specific posts and purchases will survive.

Our FDUTPA page addresses the statute in more detail.

Looking Ahead: Two 2026 Decisions That Continue the Trend

Two decisions issued since the close of 2025 confirm that the court’s focus on enforcement mechanics is continuing. In Frida Kahlo Corp. v. Romeo Pinedo (April 17, 2026), the court held that cease-and-desist letters sent into the forum can support personal jurisdiction under the Lanham Act and rejected a corporate-shield defense where the individual acted in a personal capacity—extending Jekyll Island’s approach to a different kind of contact. And in Deltona Transformer Corp. v. The NOCO Co. (August 4, 2026), which we discussed at length in an earlier post, the court held that keyword bidding on a competitor’s mark is not infringement but affirmed a $12.1 million disgorgement award and a broad permanent injunction for visible use of the mark in ad text, product descriptions and customer communications. Read together with the 2025 decisions, these cases describe a court that is skeptical of technical defenses—jurisdictional, bankruptcy, or first-sale—when the record shows deliberate trading on another’s brand, and that expects plaintiffs to build that record with care.

Key Considerations for Florida Brand Owners

The five decisions translate into a short list of practical adjustments to how Florida brand owners register, contract, plead and litigate.

• Register every mark you would want to count. Under Top Tobacco, statutory damages for counterfeiting are assessed per counterfeit mark per type of goods, without any need to prove willfulness or actual loss. A product line protected by a house mark, a product name, a logo and a slogan carries four times the statutory exposure of one protected by a single word mark. Registration is also the prerequisite for the platform enforcement programs and customs recordation that intercept counterfeits before they reach Florida consumers.
• Elect statutory damages deliberately, and name the individuals. Where actual damages are hard to prove, the § 1117(c) election is now well protected in this circuit against ratio-based and due process challenges. The officers and owners who direct counterfeit sales can be joined and held personally liable, which is often the only path to collection.
• Sue the registrant, not just the seller. After Jekyll Island, a foreign entity that owns U.S. registrations and reaches the U.S. market through affiliates can be sued here under Rule 4(k)(2). Complaints against offshore brand holders should plead the registrations, the affiliates’ U.S. sales, the U.S.-directed marketing and the U.S. counsel relationships, and should include a cancellation claim where the registrations are vulnerable — the claim that most directly “arises from” the registration contacts.
• Reconsider offshore holding structures for your own marks. The same reasoning that subjected Polygroup Macau to suit applies to a Florida company’s foreign IP-holding affiliate. Structures adopted for tax or asset-protection reasons should be reviewed with the understanding that the holding entity is amenable to Lanham Act suits in U.S. courts and that its registrations can be attacked here.
• Build a bankruptcy-proof judgment. BenShot makes willful and malicious findings the key to surviving a corporate Subchapter V discharge. Plead willfulness and malice expressly, request special-verdict questions on them, obtain express findings in bench trials, consent judgments and defaults, and, when an infringer files, move promptly for a determination of nondischargeability under § 523(a)(6) rather than accepting a cram-down.
• Draft licenses and distribution agreements for termination. Nutradose confirms that an ex-licensee has no right to sell off inventory under the mark unless the agreement grants one. Agreements should state expressly whether any sell-off period exists, require the return or destruction of branded inventory and marketing materials, prohibit any statement that the former licensee is the source of the goods, and specify the domain names, social-media accounts and hashtags that must be surrendered.
• Police resellers for more than resale. The first-sale doctrine protects the truthful resale of genuine goods. A reseller that misrepresents its relationship to the brand, alters the goods, or sells goods outside quality-control channels loses the defense. Monitoring programs should capture what resellers say, not only what they sell.
• Plead FDUTPA with particularity. After Pop, a FDUTPA count that rests on deception should identify the specific statements, dates, speakers and consumer purchases, and should be drafted to satisfy Rule 9(b) even when it accompanies a Lanham Act count that need not. Where the FDUTPA theory is unfair competition rather than deception—for example, a per se violation based on trademark infringement—say so expressly to avoid the heightened standard.
• Manage influencers as advertising. Whether or not a consumer plaintiff can plead around Pop, undisclosed paid endorsements violate the FTC’s endorsement guides and expose the brand to regulatory action and to competitor false-advertising claims under Section 43(a)(1)(B). Influencer agreements should require conspicuous disclosure in every post, and the brand should monitor compliance.
• Keep the record in mind from the first demand letter. Every one of these decisions turned on facts that were created long before suit—the number of marks registered, the affiliates’ sales, the malicious email to the supplier, the ex-licensee’s website, the influencer’s undisclosed posts. The brand owners who prevailed had preserved and proved those facts. A monitoring and documentation program, of the kind we have described in earlier posts on online advertising and hashtag enforcement, is what turns these decisions into remedies.

Conclusion

The Eleventh Circuit’s 2025 trademark decisions did not change the test for infringement, but they changed the odds of collecting on it. Counterfeiters cannot hide behind small actual damages, foreign registrants cannot hide behind corporate structure, willful infringers cannot hide in Subchapter V, ex-licensees cannot hide behind the first-sale doctrine, and consumer plaintiffs—and brand owners pleading FDUTPA—must show their work. For Florida brand owners, the year’s lesson is that enforcement is won on registration strategy, contract drafting, pleading discipline and record-building, well before a court ever weighs the likelihood of confusion.

If you would like to discuss how these decisions affect your brand portfolio, your licensing and distribution agreements, or a pending or contemplated enforcement matter, please visit our Trademark Matters and Litigation & Enforcement pages, or contact us at 305-374-8303.

We also serve as local counsel for out-of-state firms litigating trademark matters in Florida’s federal courts.