The Five Most Important Recent Eleventh Circuit Copyright Decisions (2024–2026) — and What Florida Content Creators Should Do About Them

Florida is home to an unusually large population of people who make a living from copyrighted work: photographers and videographers serving the real estate and tourism industries, musicians and producers in Miami and Orlando, software developers, architects, authors, and a fast-growing community of social media creators. All of them are governed, in federal court, by the decisions of the Eleventh Circuit. Those decisions arrive irregularly—the court issued only a handful of copyright opinions in 2025, most of them unpublished—so this review takes a slightly longer view and identifies the five decisions from 2024 through mid-2026 that mostly impact how a Florida creator should protect, license and enforce a copyright. It then notes the 2025 unpublished decisions worth knowing and closes with practical recommendations.

For an overview of our copyright registration, licensing and enforcement services, see Copyright Matters; for how we handle infringement disputes, see Litigation & Enforcement.

Affordable Aerial Photography, Inc. v. Property Matters USA, LLC (July 30, 2024): A Defendant Who Wins by Voluntary Dismissal Is Not a “Prevailing Party” — and the Discovery Rule Lives On

The Facts

Affordable Aerial Photography, a Florida real estate photography company that is one of the most active copyright plaintiffs in the state, took an aerial photograph in 2010, registered it in 2018, and discovered in February 2022 that a real estate business had used it on its website. It sued in the Southern District of Florida. The defendant moved to dismiss on the ground that the photograph had been on the website for more than three years and the claim was time-barred under the Copyright Act’s three-year limitations period. Before the court ruled, the photographer voluntarily dismissed the case without prejudice under Rule 41(a). The defendant then moved for attorney’s fees as the “prevailing party” under 17 U.S.C. § 505.

The Holding

In an opinion by Judge Lagoa, the Eleventh Circuit affirmed the denial of fees. Prevailing-party status requires a “material alteration of the legal relationship of the parties” that carries “judicial imprimatur”—in the copyright context, a judicial rejection of the plaintiff’s claim. A voluntary dismissal without prejudice does neither: the plaintiff remains free to refile, the defendant has obtained no ruling on the merits, and the district court’s order merely acknowledged a dismissal the plaintiff was entitled to take as of right. The court also declined to treat the limitations defense as though it had been decided, observing that under the discovery rule applied in this circuit the claim accrued when the photographer discovered the infringement in 2022, not when the photograph was first posted.

Why It Matters

The decision has two practical consequences for Florida creators and for the businesses they sue. First, a plaintiff who realizes that a case is weaker than expected can exit without prejudice and without exposure to a fee award—a meaningful protection for individual photographers and small studios for whom a six-figure fee award would be ruinous. Second, and more broadly, the opinion reaffirms that the Eleventh Circuit applies the discovery rule to copyright claims: the three-year clock starts when the owner knew or reasonably should have known of the infringement, not when the infringement began. Combined with the Supreme Court’s 2024 decision in Warner Chappell Music v. Nealy—which arose from this circuit and held that a timely claim under the discovery rule can recover damages for infringements more than three years old. The rule gives Florida creators a longer reach against old online infringements than plaintiffs enjoy in some other circuits. Defendants should note the converse: a limitations defense based solely on the date of first posting will rarely succeed here.

Compulife Software, Inc. v. Newman (August 1, 2024): How Software Copyright Is Analyzed — and When Web Scraping Becomes Trade Secret Misappropriation

The Facts

Compulife, a Florida company, sells a database and software that generate life-insurance quotes. Competitors, working with a hacker, obtained a copy of the software’s source code and launched a “scraping attack” that extracted millions of quotes from Compulife’s public website, then used both the code and the quotes to run competing quote websites. After a bench trial, the district court found no copyright infringement and no trade secret misappropriation. The Eleventh Circuit reversed in 2020 (Compulife I) and remanded with instructions on both claims. On remand the district court again found no copyright infringement but found trade secret misappropriation, and both sides appealed.

The Holding

The 2024 decision (Compulife II) addressed both claims. On copyright, the court reaffirmed that infringement of a computer program is analyzed under the “abstraction-filtration-comparison” test: the court breaks the program into its constituent parts, filters out unprotectable elements (ideas, processes, elements dictated by efficiency or external factors, and public-domain material), and compares what remains. The district court had found that although roughly 84 percent of the code had been copied, only about eight percent was protectable expression, and that the copying of that portion was not significant.

The Eleventh Circuit held that this analysis was incomplete: the district court had examined the copied variables in isolation and never considered whether the arrangement of those variables in the code was itself a protectable constituent element that had been copied. It vacated the copyright judgment and remanded for that analysis. On trade secrets, the court affirmed liability. The quotes were trade secrets even though individual quotes were publicly available on the website, because the compilation of millions of them was not, and obtaining them by a scraping attack that circumvented the site’s design was an “improper means.” The court was careful to note that “scraping and related technologies ... may be perfectly legitimate” and that “[m]uch of the modern internet is built on those technologies,” but that the defendants’ use of code to conduct an automated attack was not.

Why It Matters

For Florida software developers and data businesses, Compulife II is the governing statement of two principles. First, copyright in software is real but thin: the percentage of code copied means little if the copied material is functional, and a plaintiff must be prepared to walk the court through the filtration analysis—including the selection and arrangement of otherwise unprotectable elements—and prove that what remains was copied. Second, trade secret law—federal and Florida—often protects what copyright does not, and unauthorized mass scraping of a compiled database is misappropriation even when the individual data points are public. Developers should structure their protection accordingly, with copyright registration for the code, terms of service and technical measures that make scraping an improper means, and trade-secret discipline over the compiled data.

Our Trade Secret Matters page describes that discipline.

Morford v. Cattelan (August 16, 2024): Posting a Work Online Does Not Prove Access, and “Striking Similarity” Means Striking!

The Facts

In 2019 the Italian artist Maurizio Cattelan exhibited Comedian—a banana duct-taped to a wall—at Art Basel Miami Beach, where it sold for more than $100,000 and became an international sensation. Joe Morford, a California artist, sued in the Southern District of Florida, alleging that Comedian infringed his 2000 work Banana and Orange, which depicted a banana and an orange duct-taped to a green panel and which he had posted on Facebook, YouTube and a blog. The district court granted summary judgment for Cattelan, and Morford appealed.

The Holding

The Eleventh Circuit affirmed. A copyright plaintiff must prove that the defendant actually copied the work, which can be shown either by proof of access plus substantial similarity or, absent access, by “striking similarity” so great that it can be explained only by copying. Morford’s evidence of access was that his work had been available on the internet for a decade and had been viewed in more than twenty-five countries.

The court held that this was insufficient: the mere presence of a work online, without evidence that the defendant visited the site or that the work was widely disseminated in a way that made encounter likely, is “too speculative” to establish a reasonable possibility of access. Nor were the works strikingly similar. Among other differences, Morford’s included an orange and Cattelan’s did not, and the shared idea of taping fruit to a wall is not protectable expression.

Why It Matters

Florida creators who post their work online and later see something similar from a well-known artist, brand or influencer should understand what Morford requires. Internet availability alone will not carry the access element. The plaintiff needs evidence that the defendant visited the platform, followed the creator, was sent the work, or that the work achieved the kind of wide dissemination—substantial views, press coverage, licensing—that makes encounter reasonably likely. Where access cannot be shown, only striking similarity suffices, and courts will filter out shared ideas and concepts before making that comparison. The practical lesson is to build the access record before it is needed: keep analytics, follower lists, tags and mentions, submission records, and any correspondence with the alleged infringer.

Great Bowery Inc. v. Consequence Sound LLC (May 5, 2026): A Licensee Can Hold Exclusive Rights—and Standing to Sue—Even When the Owner Keeps Some Rights

The Facts

Great Bowery, doing business as Trunk Archive, is a photography licensing agency. Under a 2014 agreement, photographer Annie Leibovitz granted it the exclusive right to license and market certain photographs, while reserving the ability to authorize a few identified third parties. Condé Nast, who was not part of the identified third parties, held a non-exclusive license from Ms. Leibovitz to publish images from a Star Wars photo shoot in Vanity Fair. In 2022, wthose images appeared on a music-news website without permission from Trunk Archive and they sued in the Southern District of Florida. The district court held that because the photographer had retained rights and had granted non-exclusive licenses to others, Trunk Archive’s license was not “exclusive,” it was therefore not a “legal or beneficial owner” under 17 U.S.C. § 501(b), and it lacked standing to sue.

The Holding

The Eleventh Circuit, in an opinion by a panel of Judges Jordan, Newsom and Corrigan, vacated. Copyright is divisible under Section 106 and Section 201(d): an owner may transfer any of the exclusive rights, or any subdivision of them, and each transferee owns what it received. A license “is not rendered non-exclusive merely because the copyright owner retained certain rights” or had earlier granted non-exclusive licenses to others, because a non-exclusive license conveys only permission, not ownership, and therefore does not diminish the ownership interest later transferred. What matters is whether the grant to the licensee was itself exclusive as to the rights it covers and was made in a signed writing as Section 204(a) requires. The court remanded for the district court to determine whether the 2014 agreement or a 2018 authorization letter transferred exclusive rights to Trunk Archive.

Why It Matters

Agencies, publishers, labels, distributors and licensing platforms routinely hold rights that are “exclusive” in the commercial sense but carve out reserved uses for the creator or pre-existing licensees. Before Great Bowery, a defendant in this circuit could argue that any such carve-out destroyed exclusivity and, with it, the licensee’s standing. The decision closes that argument, provided the agreement is drafted properly: it must identify the specific Section 106 rights being transferred, state that the transfer is exclusive as to those rights, and be signed by the owner. For creators, the same holding cuts the other way—a poorly drafted “exclusive” agency or distribution agreement can transfer ownership of the right to sue, and creators should understand exactly what they are giving up.

Our Entertainment Law practice handles these agreements for both sides.

Lil’ Joe Records, Inc. v. Won (June 2, 2026): A Creator’s Termination Right Can Be Lost in Bankruptcy

The Facts

The members of 2 Live Crew assigned the sound-recording copyrights in their first five albums to Luke Records in the late 1980s. Luke Records’ 1995 bankruptcy transferred the copyrights to Lil’ Joe Records. In 2000, group member Mark Ross filed a personal Chapter 7 bankruptcy and did not schedule his copyright interests. In 2020, within the statutory window, Ross, Luther Campbell and the heirs of a deceased member served a notice of termination under Section 203 of the Copyright Act, which allows authors to recapture transferred copyrights thirty-five years after the grant. A Miami jury found the termination effective, and the district court entered judgment restoring the copyrights to the group.

The Holding

The Eleventh Circuit reversed in a published opinion by Judge Brasher. Section 203 makes the termination right inalienable—it “may be effected notwithstanding any agreement to the contrary”—but the court held that inalienability under the Copyright Act does not remove the interest from a bankruptcy estate under 11 U.S.C. § 541, which sweeps in “all legal or equitable interests of the debtor” as of the petition date regardless of restrictions on transfer under non-bankruptcy law. Because Ross never scheduled his termination interest, it was never administered or abandoned, and it remained property of his estate—not his—when he purported to exercise it in 2020. Without Ross, only two of the four authors’ interests joined the notice, one short of the majority Section 203 requires. “So two out of four interests,” the court wrote, “is one interest short of an effective termination.”

Why It Matters

Termination rights are the most valuable asset many Florida musicians, songwriters, authors and visual artists own, and the decision shows how easily they can be lost. Any creator who has ever filed bankruptcy—or who co-owns a work with someone who has—must determine whether termination interests were scheduled, administered or abandoned, because an unscheduled interest may still belong to a long-closed estate. Creators contemplating bankruptcy should schedule termination interests expressly and seek their abandonment or exemption. And any joint-work termination should be planned years in advance to confirm that a majority of the authors’ interests is actually available to sign. The decision is also a reminder that the recapture window is short and unforgiving: the notice must be served between two and ten years before the effective date, and errors are rarely curable.

The 2025 Unpublished Decisions Worth Knowing

Two 2025 decisions, though unpublished and therefore non-binding, address questions that Florida creators face regularly:

McKinney v. Portico LLC (January 22, 2025). An architect’s agreement for a Perdido Bay condominium project incorporated the standard AIA B101 form, under which the owner keeps a license to use the architect’s drawings only if the agreement is not terminated for the architect’s default and the architect has been paid. The owner terminated “for cause,” kept using the drawings, and moved to dismiss the architect’s copyright claim on the ground that it retained a license. The Eleventh Circuit vacated the dismissal: if the termination for cause was itself wrongful, no license survived, and whether the owner could retroactively recast the termination as one “for convenience” was a question of Florida contract law that could not be resolved on a motion to dismiss. The case illustrates that, for architects, designers, photographers and developers who deliver work under contract, the copyright claim often rises or falls on the contract’s termination and payment provisions.

World Media Alliance Label, Inc. v. Believe SAS (July 28, 2025). A Florida music company that claimed rights in the catalog of a Russian pop group sued a French digital distributor for placing 44 of the group’s songs on YouTube. The Eleventh Circuit affirmed dismissal for lack of personal jurisdiction under Florida’s long-arm statute because the complaint alleged only that the songs were available on YouTube, not that anyone in Florida had actually accessed them. “At most,” the court said, the plaintiff suggested that Florida residents “might have access to the allegedly infringing work online, but it does not state that Florida residents have actually accessed it.” For Florida plaintiffs suing out-of-state or foreign online infringers, the lesson is to plead and be prepared to prove Florida access—views, downloads, sales or streams in Florida—rather than mere availability.

Recommendations for Florida Content Creators:

Read together, these decisions reward creators who treat copyright as an asset to be managed rather than a right that takes care of itself. Our recommendations follow the life cycle of a work.

1. Register early, and register the whole catalog

Registration within three months of publication, or before the infringement begins, is what unlocks statutory damages and attorney’s fees under Section 412. It is also what puts a plaintiff in the position to dismiss a weak case voluntarily without fee exposure, as Affordable Aerial confirms. Group registration options for photographs, serial works and short online literary works make catalog-wide registration affordable, and we regularly set up quarterly registration programs for photographers, publishers and studios.

2. Keep the evidence that proves creation, ownership and access

Morford shows that a creator who cannot prove the defendant encountered the work will lose unless the copying is striking. Maintain dated source files and drafts, publication records, platform analytics, follower and engagement data, submission and pitch logs, and any communication with the people who later produce similar work. Compulife shows that software plaintiffs must be ready to identify the protectable expression in their code with precision. Commented, version-controlled source and a written description of the program’s original design choices will be needed at trial.

3. Monitor for infringement and calendar the discovery date

Because the Eleventh Circuit applies the discovery rule and Nealy permits damages for older infringements once a timely claim is filed, the date on which a creator discovered—or reasonably should have discovered—an infringement is the single most important fact in a limitations dispute. Run reverse-image and audio-fingerprint searches on a schedule, document each discovery with a dated capture, and act within three years of it.

4. Draft licenses and agency agreements to say exactly what is exclusive

Great Bowery makes the drafting of an exclusive license dispositive of the licensee’s right to sue. Agreements with agencies, distributors, labels, publishers and licensing platforms should identify the specific Section 106 rights being conveyed, state expressly whether each is exclusive, list any reserved rights and pre-existing licenses, and be signed by the copyright owner. Creators should also understand that an exclusive grant transfers ownership of the covered rights—including standing to sue—and should decide deliberately whether that is what they intend.

5. Treat contract termination as a copyright event

McKinney is a reminder that for works delivered under contract, the license the client holds is usually conditioned on payment and on the manner of termination. Architects, designers, developers and photographers should use agreements that condition the client’s license on full payment, that specify what happens to the license on termination for cause versus convenience, and that require the return or cessation of use of deliverables when the license ends. Clients, for their part, should not assume a license survives a disputed termination.

6. Protect data and compilations with terms of service and trade-secret discipline

Compulife confirms that mass scraping in violation of a site’s design can be trade-secret misappropriation even where the individual data points are public. Creators and businesses that publish valuable compilations—listings, quotes, catalogs, datasets—should adopt terms of service that prohibit automated extraction, deploy technical measures that make scraping an “improper means,” and treat the compiled database as a trade secret. Copyright protection for the compilation should be claimed as well, but it will be thin.

7. Protect termination rights before and during any bankruptcy

Lil’ Joe Records makes termination interests a bankruptcy asset. A creator who files should schedule every copyright and termination interest, seek abandonment of interests the estate will not administer, and confirm at closing that the interests were returned. A creator who has previously filed should have counsel review the schedules now, years before any termination window opens. And co-authors planning a joint termination should verify each participant’s ownership of his or her interest well in advance.

8. Plead jurisdiction over online infringers with Florida-specific facts

World Media Alliance teaches that availability online is not a Florida contact. A complaint against an out-of-state or foreign infringer should allege Florida views, downloads, purchases or streams, Florida-directed marketing, and any Florida business relationships, and the creator should gather that evidence—platform analytics, geolocated sales data, test purchases from Florida—before filing.

9. Address AI-generated and AI-assisted work separately

None of these decisions involved generative AI, but the same principles apply with added complexity. AI-assisted works must be registered with accurate disclosure of AI-generated material, agreements should allocate ownership of AI outputs, and any use of a real person’s likeness or voice requires clearance. Our earlier posts on the Copyright Office’s copyrightability report, the Bartz v. Anthropic settlement and digital replicas address each of those subjects in detail.

Conclusion

The Eleventh Circuit’s recent copyright decisions do not announce sweeping new doctrine. They do something more useful for a working creator: they identify, one at a time, the practical steps on which a copyright claim succeeds or fails in Florida’s federal courts—registration timing, proof of access, the precision of a software claim, the wording of a license, the handling of a bankruptcy, the terms of a contract, and the facts pleaded to bring an online infringer into court. Creators who attend to those steps will find the law in this circuit favorable. Those who do not will find that a valid copyright is not enough.

If you would like help registering a catalog, drafting or reviewing licensing and agency agreements, protecting termination rights, or enforcing a copyright against an online infringer, please visit our Copyright Matters, Entertainment Law and Litigation & Enforcement pages, or contact us at 305-374-8303.